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CHAPTER 3
The Neo-Developmentalist Alternative: Capitalist 
Crisis, Popular Movements, and Economic 
Development in Argentina since the 1990s
Mariano Féliz
After the economic meltdown of 2001 Argentina appeared to enter a new 
period of sustainable economic growth and relative political stability. After 
the crisis, changes in public policies were so far-reaching that several authors 
have argued that Argentina underwent a transition from neoliberal rule to an 
altogether new period of neo-developmentalism.1 This chapter argues that 
while neo-developmentalism represents a break with neoliberalism in some 
respects, the changes in macroeconomic policies also express profound con-
tinuities with past neoliberal policies. Furthermore, any changes must be 
understood as the result of shifts in the correlation of political forces in the 
broader regional and international context, rather than a conscious policy 
‘choice’ per se.
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section discusses the dynam-
ics of neoliberal rule and its crisis in Argentina between 1991 and 2001. The sec-
ond section presents the main structural continuities of the current process in 
relation to earlier periods of neoliberal orthodoxy. The third section analyses 
the new political foundations of neo-developmentalism, while the following 
section discusses changes in public policies showing how they manifest the 
particular articulation of continuity and change. We finish our discussion with 
a few preliminary conclusions.
 Neoliberal Transformations: Structural Adjustment, Class Struggle 
and Crisis
Neoliberalism has been a worldwide process meant to restore capitalist class 
power over society.2 In this sense, neoliberalism implies a regime shift: a pro-
cess that puts into action a set of policies intended to alter the balance of 
1    Curia 2007.
2    Harvey 2009.
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forces in favour of capital instead of labour.3 In general terms, the transition 
into neoliberalism from Fordism (the so-called ‘golden years’ of capitalism 
between the 1940s and the 1960s) began to materialise in Chile in 1973, fol-
lowed by Argentina in 1976, the uk under Thatcher in the late 1970s, and the us 
under Reagan in the early 1980s.
In Argentina, dominant classes had been trying to regain uncontested social 
control of production since the 1970s.4 Since the 1940s, organised labour in 
Argentina had been able to gain considerable social power as the economy 
passed through several phases of industrialisation led by a developmentalist 
ideology.5 By 1973 industrial gdp had peaked at 24.2 percent of total gdp.6 
Thus, even the dictatorship of 1976–1983 (the first stage of the neoliberal era) 
was not enough to undermine the power of the labour movement.7 While the
military government kidnapped and killed several thousand political activists, 
relatively low unemployment levels prevented an all-out attack on labour.8 
Even if political repression weakened the labour movement, low unemploy-
ment rates helped it to maintain its structural power and continue the struggle 
for better working conditions.9
All of this changed in the 1980s. During the second stage of neoliberalism, 
capital fled from production into the financial sector, while advancing in its 
concentration and centralisation by means of stagnation.10 According to the 
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos (National Institute of Statistics and 
the Census, indec) gdp per capita fell 23 percent between 1980 and 1989.11 
Gross investment in fixed capital fell 1.7 percent per year between 1984 and 
1990. Industrial employment fell 26.6 percent between 1984 and 1993.12 The 
contribution of industry as a proportion of gdp fell from 27.2 between 1970–
1979 to 18.1 percent in 1991.13 The precarisation of labour also intensified as 
3     Jessop 2010.
4     Féliz and Pérez 2004; James 1990.
5     Basualdo 2006a; Peralta Ramos 2007; Neffa 2008.
6     Ferreres 2005.
7     Pozzi and Schneider 1993; Bonnet and Glavich 1993.
8     Canitrot 1981.
9     See Selwyn this volume for a definition of ‘structural power’. See Pozzi 2008; Basualdo, no 
date, on the Argentine case.
10    Basualdo 2006a; Féliz and Pérez 2004.
11    All data provided in the chapter comes from the National Institute of Statistics and the 
Census (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos, indec) unless noted otherwise.
12    Azpiazu 1998.
13    Ferreres 2005.
52-72_Spronk_f4.indd   53 7/23/2014   8:13:11 PM
54 fÉliz
the unemployment rate grew from 2.5 percent in 1980 to 7.6 percent in 1989.14 
Eventually, after two hyperinflationary episodes in 1989 and 1990, capital had 
set the scene for its final strike: the Convertibility Plan (cp) of April 1991.
The year 1991 was a milestone in the neoliberal structural adjustment of 
Argentina’s capitalist economy. The implementation of the cp, which lasted 
until early 2002, completed the plan of Argentina’s dominant classes for a 
successful capitalist restructuring of society. The cp was the Washington 
Consensus translated into policy, which entailed the following measures: fix-
ing the nominal exchange rate to the us dollar through a currency board (the 
Argentine Currency Board); liberalising both trade and capital accounts of the 
balance of payments; privatising most public companies and social security, as 
well as health and education services; deregulating most economic activities; 
and introducing greater flexibility to the labour market through modifications 
in labour law.15
We must stress that although in terms of the usual standards (i.e. growth, 
income distribution, social indicators, etc.) the cp might appear as a failure, in 
terms of the objectives of the dominant classes the plan was highly successful. 
Most public enterprises, as well as social security were privatised. The labour 
market was effectively liberalised, as well as most economic activities.16
The cp also allowed foreign corporations to gain control over some of the 
largest firms in the economy, which at first, was to the advantage of local firms. 
Early privatisation programs required their inclusion, particularly in the for-
mation of public-private partnerships. However, in the late 1990s most local 
partners were displaced from those partnerships.17 Big local corporations 
remained significant but subordinated actors in the economy. Exceptions to 
this rule were those large local corporations that had been able to succeed in 
their own trasnationalisation, such as the steel producer Techint and the food-
stuffs manufacturer Arcor. Of the top 500 corporations in Argentina, in 1993 
foreign capital controlled 32 percent, while the figure reached 48 percent in 
14    For some authors, neoliberal rule was led in Argentina by a process of (unproductive) 
financial valorisation that displaced productive accumulation. For this view, see Basualdo 
2006a. While we agree that the growing leverage of financial capital on the economy is 
important, we understand it as the result of difficulties faced by productive investment. 
As such, financialisation is an integral component of the final stage of restructuring dur-
ing the 1990s. Without the participation of financial capital the process of privatisation 
and in the reorganisation (concentration and centralisation) of capital, both transforma-
tions would have been much more difficult to achieve.
15    Lindenboim and Danani 2003.
16    Peralta Ramos 2007.
17    Basualdo 2006a.
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1998 and 66 percent in 2007. The cp succeeded in creating a new, more com-
petitive productive structure based on the export of agricultural and mining 
commodities (both as primary products such as soybeans and as their basic 
manufactures such as soybean oil).18 For the first time in many decades, every 
year since 2002 has shown for Argentina a positive result in the trade balance 
as well as in the balance of payments. Taken as a whole, the cp represented a 
frontal attack on labour’s rights as well as the consolidation of a new transna-
tional coalition of export-oriented agro-industrial and mining capitals.19
This program was pushed forward through the better part of the 1990s by 
the traditionally labour-oriented Peronist party with the critical support of 
the government-allied trade unions affiliated with the Confederación General 
del Trabajo (General Labour Confederation, cgt). In a highly corrupt process, 
many union leaders and congressional members with ties to the labour move-
ment benefited from the privatisation of state-owned enterprises. Unions were 
given responsibility for the administration of a portion of the shares of the 
privatised companies thus obtaining economic and political gains for many 
of their leaders.20 Unions were also allowed to participate in the newly priva-
tised pension system, as well as in the healthcare and insurance businesses. As 
Novick puts it, the privatisation process gave birth to a new trade movement 
with entrepreneurial interests.21 Without the cgt ’s support, the cp could not 
have advanced as it did in its objectives.
While the cp was successful in achieving the objective of the dominant 
classes to restore profitability, it also created contradictions that led eventu-
ally to the economic meltdown of 2001. This crisis became evident in the sec-
ond half of 1998 and reached its pinnacle in the final quarter of 2001.22 Rapid 
gdp growth between 1990 and 1998 – more than 57.9 percent according to 
the indec – was built on an important increase in the ratio of fixed capital 
stock to living labour, otherwise known as the organic composition of capi-
tal (occ). Between 1992 and 1998, the occ increased by 16 percent, with a 
further increase of 12.7 percent by 2001.23 This ratio expresses two combined 
18    Arceo 2006.
19    Arceo 2006; Basualdo 2006b.
20    Peralta Ramos 2007.
21    Novick 2001.
22    Féliz 2011.
23    Following Saad-Filho’s 1993 interpretation, we approximate the occ as the ratio between 
real fixed capital stock and total hours worked. See Iñigo Carrera 2007a. Empirically this 
allows us to analyse changes in the occ.
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processes.24 On the one hand, at a more fundamental level, the occ represents 
the displacement of the source of surplus value (living labour) in relation to 
dead labour, that is, the replacement of human labour by machines.25 On the 
other hand, higher occ also implies greater labour productivity. In Argentina, 
labour’s productivity in manufacturing jumped 44.5 percent between 1991 and 
1998, and a further 16 percent between 1998 and 2001. Indeed, as demonstrated 
elsewhere26 the rising occ is the original source of crisis tendencies in capital-
ism that were exacerbated by Argentina’s cp, for it created the structural forces 
that led towards the eventual destruction (devalorisation) of capital in all its 
forms and manifestations (i.e. falling profitability, decreasing investment, lack 
of demand, excess relative supply).27 Increasing labour exploitation, growing 
foreign markets, and rising luxury consumption staved off, at least temporar-
ily, the tendencies posed by the rising occ.28 But most importantly, capital’s 
restructuring also implied the flexibilisation of labour and an increase in the 
rate of exploitation. According to one calculation, between 1990 and 2001 the 
ratio of exploitation rose by 40 percent.29
The process of labour flexibilisation was only possible because Argentina’s 
labour movement had been beaten and/or co-opted into accepting reforms. 
This co-optation was possible because the main labour unions affiliated
with the Peronist cgt adopted a defensive position within the context of 
the extreme disciplinary effect of hyperinflation and the increasing precari-
ousness of labour due to the restructuring of capitalist relations. According 
to the National Institute of Statistics and the Census (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas y Censos, indec), unemployment had jumped from an average 
3.6 percent in the 1970s to 10.5 percent in 1993–1994. Real wages fell by 39.9 
percent between 1974 and 1993. The combination of these political trans-
formations and economic reforms created new rules of the game in which 
24    Saad-Filho 1993; Weeks 1981.
25    As accumulation progresses this relative displacement tends to limit the possibilities of 
further expansion. For further discussion on this process see Saad-Fiho 2003; Weeks 1981; 
Mandel 1968; Shaikh 1992; and Moseley 1991.
26    See Féliz 2007; Féliz 2009a; and Féliz 2011.
27    As occ grows and relative surplus-value production falters, the difficulties for further 
expanded valorisation of capital tends to appear as devaluation of capital (failing enter-
prises, growing unused production capacity, falling profitability, etc.). See Weeks 1981.
28    See Weeks 1981.
29    The ratio of exploitation was measured as the ratio of net surplus value and the mass of 
variable capital. Net surplus value was estimated as gross gdp minus consumed fixed cap-
ital and direct and indirect wages while direct and indirect wages where used as equiva-
lent to the mass of variable capital. See Iñigo Carrera 2007a.
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workers found it harder to defend their interests vis-à-vis capital. Finally, while 
neoliberal reforms entailed the shrinking of the domestic market, increasing 
luxury consumption by dominant classes and growing markets in new centres 
of accumulation overseas made it possible to displace the contradictions of 
accumulation into the future, at least temporarily.30 The participation of non-
workers in total income rose from 53.3 percent in 1974 to 64.2 percent in 1997.31 
On the other hand, exports went from 3.5 percent of gdp in 1974 to 10 percent 
in 1997.
By the late 1990s, however, things began to change. After several years of 
disorganisation, Argentina’s working class began to regain momentum.32 The 
cgt no longer had a monopoly on the trade union movement with the estab-
lishment of the Central de los Trabajadores Argentinos (Central of Argentine
Workers, cta), which was formed when several important unions, such as the 
national teacher’s union Confederación de Trabajadores de la Educación de 
la República Argentina (Confederation of Education Workers of Argentina’s 
Republic, ctera) and one of the main associations of public employees, 
Asociación de Trabajadores del Estado (Association of State Employees, ate), 
left the cgt to create a new organisation in 1992. The new cta, the grow-
ing piquetero movement, growing uneasiness within the ‘middle classes’ (in
particular, students, and small entrepreneurs), and even disgruntled sectors 
within the bureaucratic cgt, all came together to form a multi-pronged move-
ment of opposition to the harsh consequences of the Convertibility Plan. The 
first puebladas (popular uprisings) by the unemployed in Cutral-có and Plaza 
Huincul (in the southern provinces of the country) broke out in 1996. After two 
decades of ineffective resistance, the cgt and the cta organised several gen-
eral strikes between 1996 and 2001.33 Direct action protests (local and regional 
strikes, picket lines, road blocks, mobilisations) by workers also increased sig-
nificantly.34 Between 2000 and 2001 the unemployed became the cornerstone 
of social protests, leading numerous mobilisations that included roadblocks.35 
This progressive re-composition of the working class weakened the possibility 
of further advancement of the neoliberal project, as the available options for 
displacing the contradictions inherent in the neoliberal model of accumula-
tion were narrowing.
30    Féliz 2011.
31    Graña 2007.
32    Bonnet 2002; Piva 2001; Lucita 2001.
33    Piva 2006.
34    Gómez 2000.
35    Bonnet 2002.
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By 1998 the world market began to contract and international financial con-
ditions turned gloomy. Flagging export demand led to economic stagnation; 
valorisation and accumulation faltered. The aforementioned contradictions 
went from being potential constraints for expanded reproduction to actual 
limits. Capitalist consumption fell as financing grew dearer and expectations 
for future growth bleaker.36 With rising levels of public and private debt,37 sur-
plus value was increasingly channelled towards paying interest rather than 
productive investment.38 Profit rates for big corporations plummeted: the 
profit rate for big firms fell from an average 10 percent from 1993 to 1998 to only 
7 percent from 1997 to 2001, while absolute profits fell every year between 1997 
and 2001. These structural limits combined with the contraction in the world 
economy culminated in a devastating economic crisis. The rate of growth of 
global imports fell from an annual average of 6.4 percent in the period 1991 
and 1997 to only 3.1 percent annually between 1997 and 2002 while the price 
index of Argentina’s exports fell 12.3 percent between 1991 and 1997 and 1998 
and 2002.
Political conditions worsened for capital as the different branches of the 
recomposed working class confronted the government’s attempts to deepen 
neoliberal structural adjustment. In the elections of 1998, the strong neolib-
eral alliance led by the Peronist Party, which had governed since 1989, was dis-
placed by a weak coalition called Alliance (Alianza) that tried to overcome the 
mounting crisis by addressing its symptoms rather than its causes. To reduce 
the public deficit, the government increased taxes on the upper middle classes 
(its own political base); to cope with the public foreign debt it took mea-
sures to refinance but at a much higher interest rate; finally, it reduced public 
employees’ wages and pensions by 13 percent and tried to impose a zero-deficit 
policy.39 Eventually, as the crisis reached its final stages in December 2001, the 
government imposed a strict limit on the extraction of cash from banks in an 
attempt to stop the staggering reduction in bank deposits: during 2001 bank 
deposits fell by 20 percent. Social and political opposition to these policies 
weakened the government’s support.40
36    Astarita 2001.
37    Damill, Frenkel, and Rapetti 2005.
38    Duménil and Lévy 2006.
39    Damill, Frenkel, and Maurizio 2003.
40    Bonnet 2002.
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Potential over-production became a reality: capacity utilisation in industry 
fell to 64 percent in 2001, the lowest level since 1989.41 Under-consumption 
(the flip side of over-production) became a problem as real wages fell due to 
policy choices and recession. Capital flight increased as the political situa-
tion deteriorated: between December 2000 and December 2001 capital flight 
reached us$12 trillion. Deflationary pressures and then the devaluation of the 
exchange rate were progressively the outcome of a process that had created 
the conditions for commodity devaluation across the board.42
The crisis of the cp appeared to most analysts as a typical stop-go process, 
perhaps mediated by a sudden stop in capital inflow.43 However, under the 
appearance of the archetypical exchange rate crisis produced by the lack of 
finance for deficit in the external accounts, this time the fleeing capital was 
nothing more than the paradoxical manifestation of the successful restruc-
turing of capitalist production in Argentina.44 In fact, financial capital only 
began to abandon Argentina in late 2000 while, according to the Centro de 
Economía Internacional (Centre of International Economy, cei), country risk 
had begun rising as late as the first quarter of 2001. Deflationary tendencies 
were the partial result of the increasing productivity combined with the paral-
lel contraction of foreign and domestic demand. Given the fact that increases 
to productivity in Argentina’s industry outstripped that of the United States 
(the country that holds the world currency, the us dollar) and that real wages 
had also fallen substantially in relative terms to the us between 1991 and 2001, 
falling unit costs were manifest in pressures for currency devaluation or price 
deflation in dollar terms.45 In short, given falling relative unit labour costs and 
increasing competitive pressures in a situation of falling demand, local prices 
as measured in us dollars had to fall. They began to do so as between 1998 
and 2001 the producer price index fell by 5.3 percent. However, the Argentine 
Currency Board made these processes extremely complicated. Currency 
devaluation thus appeared to be the most feasible option to restore profitabil-
ity given the increasing productivity of local capital and falling relative unit 
41    Fundación de Investigaciones Económicas Latinoamericanas (Foundation of Latin 
American Economic Research, fiel), available at: <www.fiel.org>.
42    See Féliz 2007; Féliz 2009a.
43    See Calvo et al. 2003. For example, Kalantzis 2004 explains that flagging exports caused the 
crisis. While sluggish exports are one of the elements behind the crisis, they are not their 
cause. See Féliz 2007.
44    See Féliz 2009a; Féliz 2011.
45    See Féliz 2009a.
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labour costs compared with the rest of the world.46 The nominal exchange rate 
was devalued by 40 percent in January 2002 but then entered into an uncon-
trollable spin, reaching 200 percent nominal devaluation by the end of the first 
quarter of 2002, after which it stabilised.
 How Neoliberal Restructuring Created the Structural Foundations 
of Neo-Developmentalism
Without changing Argentina’s peripheral position within the circuit of global 
capital,47 this process did allow dominant fractions within the capitalist class, 
such as the export-oriented, transnational, and concentrated capitals in the 
mining and agricultural sectors, to place themselves in a hegemonic position.48 
This position would allow them to control and orient the process of valorisa-
tion and accumulation of capital in the local economy.49
46    See Shaikh 1991; Féliz 2009a. Rising productivity was the other side of the coin of increas-
ing occ (Féliz 2011) since as Marx explained rising occ is the expression of such process. 
See Marx 2000.
47    Argentina’s capitalist economy can be characterised as peripheral and dependent. This 
implies at least two elements. First, the economy has a low level of development of its 
productive forces in comparison with the main economies (such as those of the G8). 
Second, the development of capitalist relations in such an economy creates particular 
relations in production and circulation of value giving way to especially high levels of 
dependence on foreign capital in different forms. See Marini 1973; 1979.
48    According to Ortiz and Schorr, the leading industrial conglomerates and enterprises 
organised in the Unión Industrial Argentina (Argentine Industrial Union, uia) began to 
demand an exit from the cp already by 1998. Together with Basualdo, they stress the fact 
the uia with other business groups related to export and import competing activities 
constituted a bloc within the dominant class. They confronted the privatised enterprises 
and foreign banks and corporations who preferred the alternative of dollarisation of the 
economy. While we agree that interests within the dominant classes grew more divergent 
as the crisis deepened, we think that the resulting alternative (devaluation) was forced 
by the structural tendencies: falling relative real unit labour costs, fleeing capital, falling 
demand, and plummeting profitability. The main beneficiaries of the exit from the cp 
were the same sectors that grew during the neoliberal phase. For more information, see 
Ortiz and Schorr 2007; Basualdo 2006.
49    In the process that had begun in the seventies, big local and foreign capitals, especially 
those tied to the agro-industrial and mining export-oriented complex, displaced local, 
industrial, mid-sized firms from control of the process of capital accumulation. See 
Basualdo 2006.
52-72_Spronk_f4.indd   60 7/23/2014   8:13:12 PM
 61the neo-developmentalist alternative in argentina
The fall of the cp came about as the result of the contradictory tendencies 
of capitalist development in Argentina. The convergence of the successful 
model of capital accumulation (gdp growth based upon rising labour produc-
tivity and increasing occ) with political developments (the recomposition of 
labour) created the material preconditions for the crisis. However, while the cri-
sis of the cp presented itself as the exhaustion of neoliberalism in Argentina,50 
it did not in fact lead to its definitive end but rather its recomposition.51 
From 2002 onwards, neo-developmentalism has allowed the dominant classes 
to recreate their hegemony by building on the foundations laid during the 
neoliberal phase.52 In particular, the neo-developmentalist project retains 
two major structural elements of neoliberalism: the plundering of common 
goods via an extractivist model of development and the super-exploitation
of labour.
First, in the post-2002 era, the exploitation and export of primary products 
from the mining and agricultural sectors became one of the main sources of 
surplus value in the form of absolute and relative rent.53 Rent appropriated 
by landowners jumped from 6,514 million constant pesos in 1991 to 21,600 mil-
lion constant pesos in 2004. Primary production grew 31 percent between 1993 
and 2003, coming to represent 9.9 percent of nominal gdp by 2003. Exports 
of primary commodities (such as soya bean) and manufactured commodities 
(such as soya oil) reached 10.8 percent of gdp and 74 percent of total exports 
that same year, becoming the main source of foreign currency. In particular, 
soya exports have grown exponentially. Between 2002 and 2010 they aver-
aged 220 percent more tonnes than in 1991–2000, according to the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Stockbreeding and Fishing (Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y 
Pesca). Total exports grew 123 percent in the same period.
Second, precarious employment remained the source of a significant por-
tion of surplus-extraction. In other words, the new capitalist strategy after 
the crisis of the cp retained super-exploitation of labour as a means of its 
valorisation. In 2009, 35 percent of the salaried workforce remained informal 
50    See Lascano 2001.
51    See Castorina in this volume.
52    Azpiazu and Schorr 2010b, p. 229 state that the year 2002 expressed the breaking point of 
the hegemony of the pre-eminence of financial valorisation and structural adjustment, 
beginning the transit towards a new, imprecise and uncertain regime of accumulation.
53    See definition of absolute and differential rent in the introduction to this volume, based 
on Iñigo Carrera 2007a. For further discussion see the review by Campbell 2002 and chap-
ters by Grinbert and Starosta and Purcell in this volume.
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workers, more than 20 percent of the working class lived below the poverty 
line.54 Average wages have remained at their lowest levels in 30 years.55
These two elements of continuity between neoliberalism and neo-devel-
opmentalism have produced new economic dynamics in the first decade of 
the twenty-first century, expressed in higher profit rates and a devalued real 
exchange rate. On the one hand, the orientation of capital towards production 
in rent-producing export commodities together with the persistence of his-
torically low levels of wages has meant even higher profit rates. In 2006–2007, 
for example, profit rates were 16.6 percent compared to 10.4 percent in 1993.56 
Today, profit rates are even higher for export-oriented capital. On the other 
hand, the combination of a higher level of relative productivity obtained dur-
ing the 1990s and the persistence of high levels of labour flexibility (and thus 
low relative real unit labour costs) has allowed for the real exchange rate (rer) 
to remain at relatively competitive values: the rer was 78.9 percent more com-
petitive (devalued in real terms) during 2009 than in the mid-nineties (1998).57 
In fact, rer competitiveness is the other face of a relatively high ratio of pro-
ductivity to real wages. Based on these structural conditions capital’s ability to 
expand has remained strong since mid-2002, even if challenged by the dynam-
ics of class struggle.
Neo-developmentalism not only advanced due to changes to the structural 
conditions at the domestic level but to significant changes in the world market. 
Two of these changes were particularly important for Argentina. First, China 
became a major trading partner. In fact, Argentina’s trade with China jumped 
from a yearly average 2.2 percent of total exports between 1990 and 2001 and 
to 7.7 percent of total exports between 2002 and 2008, while during the same 
period imports from China surged from an average 3.3 percent of total imports 
to 8 percent. This evolution was in line with the evolution of China’s trade: 
while China’s exports went from 1.8 percent of total world exports in 1990 to 4.3 
percent in 2001 and 9.5 percent in 2009, imports to China from the rest of world 
went from 1.4 percent of total world imports in 1990 to 3.8 percent in 2001 and 
8 percent in 2009.58
54    Féliz, López and Fernández 2010.
55    We understand super-exploitation of labour in the sense of Marini 1973.
56    Profit rates are estimated as the ratio of net profits of the top 500 corporations to their 
total circulating capital (total sales minus net profits). See the indec’s National Survey of 
Big Enterprises.
57    See Féliz 2009a on the higher rate of relative productivity. The rer was estimated as the 
ratio of the nominal rate for the us dollar (pesos per us dollar) to the ratio between the 
producer price indexes of both the us and Argentina.
58    cei.
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Second, the growing weight of soya and mineral exports allowed Argentina’s 
capitalist class to profit from growing commodity prices: in 2009 Argentina’s 
terms of trade were 40 percent higher than the average of the period 1990–
2001. This change allowed Argentina’s economy to find a significant space for 
exports in the neo-developmentalist phase: total exports of goods and services 
grew from 6.9 percent of gdp in 1993 to more than 21.3 percent in 2009, while 
net exports (exports minus imports) of goods and services went from a deficit 
of 2.4 percent of gdp in 1993 to a surplus of over 5.3 percent in 2009.
 The Political Foundations of Argentina’s Neo-Developmentalism
The transition from neoliberalism to neo-developmentalism in Argentina was 
no easy task for the dominant classes. During the first months of 2002, it was 
not at all clear for anyone (not even for the dominant fractions of capital) which 
direction the development process would take in the context of extreme eco-
nomic and political uncertainty. The progressive unfolding of a neo-develop-
mentalist strategy was in fact not the result of a planned transition but rather 
the outcome of an articulation of the new structural restrictions and political 
challenges posed by the popular movement. In a sense, in the unfolding of the 
neo-developmentalist project dominant classes have recognised the renewed 
composition of the working class, the need to accommodate, albeit partially, 
some of its demands, and the limits they pose on their strategic goals. The suc-
cessful consolidation of the neo-developmentalist strategy is an indication of 
the hegemonic construction of the dominant classes.
In the last years of the cp, the succession of misplaced attempts to solve 
the severe economic and political crisis led to increasing social unrest that 
resulted in the resignation of the Minister of the Economy on 19 December 
2001, followed by the president De la Rúa the next day. The social mobilisa-
tion during the second semester of 2001 not only ended the cp but also dis-
placed four presidents in 15 days. The interim president, elected by Congress 
in January 2002, Peronist Eduardo Duhalde, was able to resolve the financial 
and exchange rate crisis with little cost to the biggest corporations that were 
the main beneficiaries of the new policies.59 The policy package included cur-
rency devaluation, imposition of export taxes, partial public debt default, a 
price freeze on privatised public services, and ‘asymmetric pesification’. This 
last element implied that the dollar debts of big private debtors within the 
financial system were turned into peso debts (avoiding the cost of devaluation) 
59    idef-cta 2002; Basualdo, Lozano and Schorr 2002.
52-72_Spronk_f4.indd   63 7/23/2014   8:13:12 PM
64 fÉliz
while at the same time the state compensated the banks for any losses by giv-
ing them new public debt bonds.60
At the same time, the combination of mild political repression and the cre-
ation of new social programs allowed the government to stay a steady course 
in the midst of unprecedented social mobilisation. Duhalde’s government cre-
ated the most comprehensive income support program in all of Argentina’s 
history: the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar (Heads of Household Program, JyJDH).61 
This program extended income support to almost two million direct beneficia-
ries within the first few months of 2002. A number serves to illustrate the mag-
nitude of the program: in May 2003 the number of beneficiaries represented 
81.6 percent of the unemployed.62 While the amount of the benefit going to 
each household was extremely low (only about us$40 a month) it provided
a minimum income in a context where real wages had fallen by 20 percent 
between the last quarter of 2001 and the first quarter of 2002. Unemployment 
touched 25 percent of the active population, and 40 percent within the youth.
The JyJDH sought to calm down political unrest by dismantling popu-
lar organisation and to maintain the Duhalde government’s tenuous grip on 
office.63 However, the repression of a mobilisation by the piquetero movement 
on 26 June 2002 resulted in the death of two young militants of the Movimiento 
de Trabajadores Desocupados Anibal Verón (Movement of Unemployed 
Workers Anibal Verón, mtd Anibal Verón) and ended the chances of continu-
ation for Duhalde’s government.64 Presidential elections were called for early 
2003; Néstor Kirchner, a member of the same party as Duhalde, the Peronist 
Justicialist Party was elected. By May 2003 the pieces had been put into place 
for the implementation of a new regime of accumulation.
The termination of the cp laid the basis for short-run economic growth by 
adjusting the ratios of variable capital versus constant capital (thus enhancing 
profitability) and productive capital versus financial capital (thus favouring 
productive accumulation). Now that economic growth rates had recovered, 
60    lasfrc 2002.
61    Féliz and Pérez 2007.
62    Féliz and Pérez 2007.
63    Dinerstein et al. 2008.
64    The mtds were new organizations born in the 1990s. Since traditional labour unions 
and left-wing parties would not represent the mounting ranks of the unemployed, in the 
mid-1990s the mtds multiplied as new organizational forms of struggle. The mtd Anibal 
Verón was an archetypical organization that employs direct action (roadblocks) as a main 
means of struggle, base democracy, and class independence. Later in the decade several 
left-wing parties as well as the cta decided to include the mtds in their strategies. See 
Svampa and Pereyra 2003; Stratta and Barrera 2009.
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the newly elected Kirchner government set out to create the conditions for the 
reproduction and expansion of its political power. In fact, while the Kirchner 
government always stressed that the recovery of economic growth was as the 
result of their economic policy, gdp had been rising long before Kirchner was 
elected. By the first quarter of 2003, gdp was growing at a 5 percent annual 
rate. This meant that the state-form had to change to allow for a new correla-
tion of social forces that was born during the neoliberal phase.65
Kirchner consolidated a political alliance with a fraction of the labour 
movement bureaucracy (mostly within the cgt, whose new leadership had 
participated in the struggles against privatisation in the late 1990s) and local 
capital’s hegemonic fractions (of both national and transnational origin). 
Within the cgt, a new wave of grassroots activism put pressure on the bureau-
cratic leadership to make demands on the government.66 This mobilisation 
also had an important impact on the formation of new grassroots movements. 
For instance, there was a rise of young activists who were involved in new 
social movements and organisations that had sprung up all around the coun-
try in movements of unemployed workers, movements of women, community 
radio stations, etc.67 To gain the cgt ’s support, the government took steps to 
partially recover real wages that had been depressed by devaluation’s effect 
on domestic prices (particularly on basic consumption goods). In the first 12 
months after devaluation in 2002, consumer prices jumped by 41 percent while 
food prices went up by 58 percent.68 The government put forward a new labour 
policy that promoted the signing of collective agreements and decreed several 
wage hikes and increases in the minimum wage for formal workers. In 2004, 
the number of formal collective agreements doubled compared to the average 
of the previous ten years, and was 20 percent higher than the year before.69
The combination of demands from below, and pro-active policies from 
above, created the conditions for a limited amelioration of working conditions 
within the formal segment of the labour force.70 While wages increased signifi-
cantly from 2002 to 2007, in 2007 real wages for formal-sector workers in the 
65    Poulantzas 1979.
66    Etchemendy and Berins Collier 2007; Basualdo 2010; Prensa de Frente 2005.
67    Lobato and Suriano 2003.
68    To avoid confusion it is important to recall that the devaluation of Argentina’s currency 
implies the increase in the peso price of the us dollar. This means that the domestic 
prices of all dollar-denominated commodities (such as exported food stuffs and fuels) 
increase when the domestic currency is devalued.
69    Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social 2005.
70    Neffa 2008.
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private sphere were just 6.7 percent over their 2001 levels, while for precarious 
workers real wages were still 22.4 percent lower and state employees were 28.4 
percent below their 2001 levels.71 The official unemployment rate also fell rap-
idly between 2002 and 2005, but high levels of informal and precarious work 
continued to prevail.72
Regarding the local bourgeoisie, the government followed an active policy 
to garner the support of a significant (and politically relevant) portion of the 
import-competing manufacturing and export-oriented business class.73 On 
the one hand, the decision to maintain a high and stable real exchange rate 
through the central bank’s massive purchase of dollars and the unofficial pol-
icy of wage ceilings was the main instrument to preserve the profitability of 
the capitalist class as a whole.74 Wage ceilings were the main macroeconomic 
element of the new labour policy and were aimed at containing wage growth 
within the growth of labour’s productivity. The government proposed a limit 
to wage increases equal to 19 percent for the year 2006 and 16.5 percent for 
2007. While the official inflation rate was 9.8 percent in 2006 (down from 12.3 
percent in 2005) many observers (including workers within indec) claimed 
actual inflation to be at least twice as much.75 In 2007, the rapid improvement 
in labour’s income hit a ceiling.76 The combination of successful repression of 
non-institutionalised conflicts, tight control (at times violent) by union lead-
ers of grassroots movements, and the difficulties in creating political alterna-
tives constricted the ability of workers to claim a larger share of value added. 
In 2008 labour’s participation in value added stagnated. In addition, the state 
supported capital’s profitability with a combination of direct and indirect sub-
sidies and renewed impetus of public investment in infrastructure projects.77
The local bourgeoisie and the cgt were the strongholds of the government’s 
societal coalition. However, Kirchner was elected by only 22 percent of eligible 
voters; he needed to build a wider support base. He came in second place in the 
first round of the 2003 elections, after the neoliberal candidate Carlos Menem 
(another Peronist who served as president from 1989 to 1999). However, since 
71    It is important to clarify that super-exploitation of labour does not imply that wages such 
stagnate or fall. While wages grew in the neo-developmentalist phase, the prevalence of 
labour precarisation meant that many workers were still earning below the minimum 
wage or even below the poverty line.
72    Rameri et al. 2008.
73    Azpiazu and Schorr 2010b.
74    Ministerio de Economía y Producción 2007; Frenkel 2005.
75    ate-indec 2008.
76    Féliz 2008.
77  Ministerio de Economía y Producción 2007.
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Menem desisted from participating in the second round, Kirchner was named 
president on 25 May 2003.78 In an adequate reading of the political situation, 
the newly appointed president moved forward on a political program that dis-
cursively rejected neoliberalism and allowed him to win additional constitu-
ents. In actual policy, the government rolled back some of the policies of the 
1990s – particularly, trials for human rights violators during the last dictator-
ship, and reassertion of state ownership over some of the companies that had 
been privatised in the 1990s, such as the Correo Argentino (Argentine postal 
service) in 2003, Aguas Argentinas (Argentine Waters, the water and sanitation 
company of Greater Buenos Aires) in 2006, Aerolíneas Argentinas (Argentine 
Airlines, the national airline) in 2008, and so on. These changes won the gov-
ernment the support of wide sectors of the middle classes and of some popu-
lar organisations, particularly a significant sector of Madres and Abuelas de 
Plaza de Mayo (Mothers and Grandmothers of May Plaza) and some piquetero 
movements such as the Federación de Tierra y Vivienda (Federation of Land 
and Housing, ftv), a member of the cta.79
The final element in the new government’s strategy for political survival in 
turbulent times was to create a new generation of social policies.80 These poli-
cies included the bifurcation of the JyJDH in 2005 into two separate programs 
aimed at those deemed to be unemployable (generally, single women with 
children) and to those signalled as potentially employable (married men).81 
Under the Plan Familias (Families Plan), beneficiaries would receive a mon-
etary incentive to return home by relinquishing work duties established under 
the former JyJDH and in return, send their kids to school and submit them to 
periodic medical check-ups. The other program, Seguro de Empleo y Formación 
(Employment and Training Insurance) paid beneficiaries to learn trades and 
to look for work. In both cases, the unspoken objective was to dismantle the 
nationwide network of movements of unemployed workers that had been able 
to use the former JyJDH as a means of mobilisation and organisation.82 The 
mtds were able to reap economic resources from the government in the form 
78    Bruschtein 2003.
79    The Madres and Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo are two of the most influential human rights 
organisations in Argentina. Born during the last dictatorship, they have fought for truth 
and punishment of those responsible for human rights violations during the period 1976–
1983. ftv is one of the most important territorial organisations born in the 1980s in the 
struggles for living conditions in the neighbourhoods of the greater Buenos Aires. See 
Stratta and Barrera 2009.
80    Dinerstein et al. 2008.
81    Pérez 2005; Pérez and Féliz 2010.
82  Golbert 2004; Castorina in this volume.
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of social allowances and financial assistance for socio-economic subsistence 
projects. These resources allowed the movements not only to improve the liv-
ing conditions of their members but also worked as organisational means to 
increase their ability to make effective demands on the state. The JyJDH was 
the pinnacle of such process. After the assassination of Kosteki and Santillán 
in 2002, the State begun to regain control of the socio-political situation, divid-
ing and co-opting a significant part of the movements of the unemployed.83
 Argentina in the Neo-Developmentalist Stage: Protected Against 
All Odds?
The new structure of capital has provided Argentina’s economy with the means 
to respond effectively to changing conditions in the world market. In fact, the 
aforementioned changes have allowed capital in Argentina to continue its 
expanded reproduction almost unharmed between 2008 and 2009 in the midst 
of the greatest crisis in the world’s capitalist economy in almost 70 years. While 
the gdp of developed economies plummeted by 3 percent between 2008 and 
2009, and peripheral countries such as Brazil contracted by 0.2 percent in 2009, 
Argentina’s economy grew 6.7 percent in 2008 and 0.9 percent in 2009, recover-
ing in 2010 to a projected 11 percent gdp growth rate.84
Several elements have to be brought to bear in order to comprehend these 
new developments.85 First, for the first time in many decades Argentina has 
been able to sustain a significant surplus in its external balance of payments 
even while growth has been significant: compared to the year before, exports 
fell by 20 percent in 2009 while imports were reduced by 32 percent. On aver-
age, the current account surplus has been equivalent to 4 percent of gdp 
between 2002 and 2009. This situation has turned the external sector of the 
economy into a buffer against the contraction of world trade during the initial 
stages of the crisis from 2008 to 2009. Thus, while exports fell significantly in 
those years, so did imports, such that the contractive impact of crippling inter-
national trade remained moderate as net exports remained stable. Besides, 
the foreign exchange surplus allowed the Central Bank to accumulate inter-
national reserves, which jumped to more than us$50 billion by 2008. These 
83    Stratta and Barrera 2009; Svampa and Pereyra 2003.
84    Stastics from Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), vari-
ous years.
85    Féliz and López 2010a, 2010b.
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reserves created a cushion to offset any possible outflow of speculative capital 
in the months of international turmoil during 2009.
Second, the devaluation of all forms of capital during and after the crisis 
of 2001–2 created ample space for capital’s contradictions ‘to move’, for it cre-
ated new sources of exploitation, recreated the means for pumping up aggre-
gate demand, and significantly diluted the drainage of surplus value towards 
financial capital. In 2002 the (international) value of commodity production 
in Argentina fell by about 30 percent, increasing the international competi-
tiveness of local capital. Meanwhile, through a process of debt default and 
renegotiation the public and private stock of debt fell significantly, reducing 
its weight on productive accumulation. Devaluation of variable capital (wages 
and salaries) between 2001 and 2002 was very important and created a buffer of 
extraordinary surplus value for the absorption of the effects of the upcoming 
international crisis.
Third, the state’s financial situation improved greatly after 2002 creating the 
means for a pro-active, counter-cyclical policy in 2008–2009. National pub-
lic expenditure reached 31 percent of gdp in 2009. This expansion included 
several infrastructure programs as well as social policy expenditures, which 
worked directly to enhance profitability, or indirectly to boost domestic aggre-
gate demand in the context falling external sales.
As the world financial and economic crisis quickly progressed, Argentina’s 
dominant sectors demanded that the government promote policies for the 
improvement of their competitive position.86 The new president, Cristina 
Fernández de Kircher (cfk), wife of former president Kirchner and faithful 
executor of the neo-developmentalist program, was elected in late 2007. cfk 
introduced a controlled devaluation of the nominal exchange rate and more 
explicit caps on wage negotiations.
The main result of this policy was that wages stagnated for the first time 
since 2002,87 which halted the falling exchange rate competitiveness (or ris-
ing relative real unit labour costs). At the same time, in the midst of the world 
food crisis in 2008, agricultural sectors of the dominant classes began a series 
of protests to push the government to reduce export taxes. In May 2008, the 
government had attempted to raise export taxes to increase fiscal revenue 
and to absorb the inflationary effect of higher crop prices due to crisis-ridden 
speculation in world commodities’ markets. Crop producers responded with 
massive demonstrations and roadblocks.88 After several weeks of protests, the 
86    Féliz 2009b.
87    Lozano 2009.
88    Grigera 2009; Sartelli et al. 2008.
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government was forced – in a divided vote in Congress – to back down from 
the increased export taxes.89 This divided vote reflected the first important 
fracture in the alliance between the government and the dominant classes, 
which as a whole still back the current economic strategy.
As the impact of the crisis advanced and with the advancement of export-
ing fractions of the bourgeoisie, social movements that were born in the pro-
cess of resistance to neoliberal rule increased their demands for public actions 
to protect the working people. The creation of the political space (‘Otro camino 
para superar la crisis’ or ‘Another road to overcome the crisis’) was a step in 
this direction. Integrated by the Frente Popular Darío Santillán (Popular Front 
Darío Santillán, fpds), the collective Economistas de Izquierda (Economists 
from the Left, edi), and the Bloque Piquetero Nacional (National Piquetero
Block, bpn), amongst other groups, this movement began a series of actions 
and mobilisations to demand lower consumption taxes, wider income support 
for the unemployed and higher taxation of export-oriented firms.90 The cta 
also demanded that the working people not pay the cost of the crisis through a 
series of mobilisations, ‘national days of struggle’, and strikes.91
To maintain political support within this context of increasing political agi-
tation, the changes in macroeconomic policy were coupled with the imple-
mentation of several programs to control the negative impact of falling export 
demand and keep a lid on social unrest.92 First, the government created the 
Programa de Recuperación Productiva (Program of Productive Recovery, 
repro), which allowed troubled firms to receive subsidies on their payroll if 
they refrained from firing workers. Under repro, a firm could suspend work-
ers, and pay reduced wages, while the state would cover the difference.93
Second, the government re-nationalised the pension system that had been 
privatised in the early 1990s.94 Nationalisation implied the transfer without 
89    Página/12 2008a.
90    See Katz et al. 2008; Página/12 2008b. For example, see the declaration “No votes contra el 
pueblo” (“Do not vote against the People”) by the space “Another path . . .” that came out 
before the June 28th elections (Document 1 2009) and the “Solicitud de audiencia con la 
Presidenta” (“Demand for audience with the President”) requested by several social move-
ments on 24 July 2009 (Prensa de Frente 2009).
91    See, for example, the National Day of Struggle (Día Nacional de Lucha) of 22 April 2009 (cta 
de los Trabajadores 2009a), the National Strike of 27 May 2009 (Página/12 2009), the state-
ments by the cta on 20 July 2009 (Agencia cta 2009) or the National Day of Mobilisation 
( Jornada Nacional de Mobilización) of 7 August 2009 (cta de los Trabajadores 2009b).
92    Pérez and Féliz 2010.
93    Lukín 2010.
94    Cufré 2008.
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pay out of all the assets of the private pension funds to the state. The state 
not only appropriated those assets (including stocks in almost fifty of the 
most important companies in the country and a sizeable share of public debt 
bonds) but also regained control of the social security taxation that was for-
merly being directed to pension funds. This move allowed the government to 
increase domestic demand by raising the incomes of pensioners. In addition, 
re-nationalisation gave the government fiscal resources to cope with mounting 
public deficits without having to return to the international debt markets.
Third, in late 2009 the government created the Asignación Universal a la 
Niñez (Universal Benefit for Children) a new, more universal program that pro-
vides benefit to adults with children and low-income informal employment 
(wages under us$380 per month) or unemployed.95 As of 2010 the plan serves 
almost four million families with children. This subsidy was meant to reach 
those who are ineligible for other social benefits. However, the implementa-
tion of the program implied the elimination of several other benefits for poor 
families (such as the Plan Familias), it is not generalised to the whole popula-
tion and it is not unconditional.96
By late-2009, the economy had begun to recover. A few months into 2010, 
employment levels had recovered to their previous peak.97 While ten years 
before Argentina’s neoliberal economy was hit hard by worsening interna-
tional conditions due to its own internal contradictions, neo-developmental-
ism seems to have provided the country with a significant cushion to soften the 
blow of the international crisis. The combination of modified internal struc-
tural conditions and a new form of the state – ready to respond to capital’s 
demands but able to adapt politically to a renewed class composition – pro-
vided the general conditions for a successful displacement of the contradic-
tions of capital accumulation.98 Argentina’s economy seems to have found a 
new path of successful capitalist accumulation without abandoning its depen-
dent and peripheral character.
95    Barrera 2009.
96    Ibid.
97    Ministerio de Trabajo, Empleo y Seguridad Social 2010.
98    External transformations – such as the aforementioned role of China – also have been 
important to allow Argentina to successfully navigate this crisis. In this article, however, 
we wish to stress the fundamental role of internal structural transformations.
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 Conclusion
Neoliberal rule in Argentina ended abruptly and violently in 2002 giving way 
to a new mode of reproduction of capitalist social relations. The neo-devel-
opmental form of capitalist development emerged as the supersession and 
paradoxical continuation of the process of capitalist restructuring that began 
in the 1970s. New political forces in action within a renewed and consolidated 
structure of the cycle of capital gave birth to a seemingly stable state-form. 
This new form of the state does not contradict the needs of dominant fractions 
of capital – to the contrary – but rather absorbs and contains in a conflictive 
manner the new forces and demands of a working people that has achieved a 
new political class composition.
Neo-developmentalism repeats two trends of the previous neoliberal stage: 
the successful (from the point of view of local dominant classes) structural 
transformation of the economy (transnationalisation based on plundering of 
common goods), and extreme exploitation of labour as a necessary element 
for successful capital valorisation. Both these elements were the fundamental 
bases upon which the main changes that constitute a new phase of capitalist 
development were introduced: a new form of the state that expresses – mainly 
through macroeconomic policy – the competitive needs of the leading frac-
tions within the dominant classes and a new set of public policies to contain 
and channel a new form of social conflict (that resulted from the constitution 
of a new class composition of labour).
What is most important is that we can no longer speak of neoliberalisation 
in Argentina as an on-going process. As a political program of the dominant 
classes looking to establish a new stable pattern of valorisation and accumu-
lation, neoliberalism has triumphed. However, such victory came about with 
two limitations. First, it did not overcome class conflict but has had to contain 
it in new ways. Second, neoliberalism did not alter Argentina’s peripheral posi-
tion in the world economy and thus it has not fully met the requirements for 
‘successful’ capitalist development.
Capitalist hegemony in Argentina appears to be stronger now than it was 
in the mid 1990s – before the crisis of the Convertibility Plan – due to strong 
and stable conditions for the production and realisation of value. But in order 
to maintain political stability, capital has had to give in to some of labour’s 
demands, reflected in the reforms to labour and social policies.
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